mirror of
https://github.com/rcourtman/Pulse.git
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Implements proper least-privilege model for RPC methods. Previously,
any UID in allowed_peer_uids could call privileged methods, meaning
another service's UID would inherit full host-level control.
Capability System:
- Three levels: read, write, admin
- Per-UID capability assignment via allowed_peers config
- Privileged methods require admin capability
- Backwards compatible with legacy allowed_peer_uids format
Configuration:
allowed_peers:
- uid: 0
capabilities: [read, write, admin] # Root gets all
- uid: 1000
capabilities: [read] # Docker: read-only
- uid: 1001
capabilities: [read, write] # Temps but not key distribution
Security benefit: Services can be granted only the capabilities they
need, preventing unintended privilege escalation.
Related to security audit 2025-11-07.
Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>
226 lines
6.4 KiB
Go
226 lines
6.4 KiB
Go
package main
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import (
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"testing"
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)
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// TestPrivilegedMethodsCompleteness ensures all host-side RPC methods are in privilegedMethods
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func TestPrivilegedMethodsCompleteness(t *testing.T) {
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// Define RPC methods that expose host-side effects
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hostSideEffects := map[string]string{
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RPCEnsureClusterKeys: "SSH key distribution to cluster nodes",
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RPCRegisterNodes: "Node discovery and registration",
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RPCRequestCleanup: "Cleanup operations on host",
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}
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// Verify each host-side effect RPC is in privilegedMethods
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for method, description := range hostSideEffects {
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if !privilegedMethods[method] {
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t.Errorf("SECURITY: %s (%s) is not in privilegedMethods - containers can call it!", method, description)
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}
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}
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// Verify read-only methods are NOT in privilegedMethods
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readOnlyMethods := map[string]string{
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RPCGetStatus: "proxy status query",
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RPCGetTemperature: "temperature data query",
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}
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for method, description := range readOnlyMethods {
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if privilegedMethods[method] {
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t.Errorf("Read-only method %s (%s) should not be in privilegedMethods", method, description)
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}
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}
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}
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// TestPrivilegedMethodsBlocked ensures containers cannot call privileged methods
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func TestPrivilegedMethodsBlocked(t *testing.T) {
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p := &Proxy{
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config: &Config{AllowIDMappedRoot: true},
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allowedPeerUIDs: map[uint32]struct{}{0: {}},
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allowedPeerGIDs: map[uint32]struct{}{0: {}},
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peerCapabilities: map[uint32]Capability{0: capabilityLegacyAll},
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idMappedUIDRanges: []idRange{{start: 100000, length: 65536}},
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idMappedGIDRanges: []idRange{{start: 100000, length: 65536}},
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}
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// Container credentials (ID-mapped root)
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containerCreds := &peerCredentials{
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uid: 101000, // Inside ID-mapped range
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gid: 101000,
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pid: 12345,
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}
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// Host credentials (real root)
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hostCreds := &peerCredentials{
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uid: 0,
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gid: 0,
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pid: 1,
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}
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// Test that containers ARE blocked from privileged methods
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t.Run("ContainerBlockedFromPrivilegedMethods", func(t *testing.T) {
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// Container should pass authentication
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caps, err := p.authorizePeer(containerCreds)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Container should pass authentication, got: %v", err)
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}
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if caps.Has(CapabilityAdmin) {
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t.Fatal("Container should not have admin capability")
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}
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})
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// Test that host CAN call privileged methods
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t.Run("HostAllowedPrivilegedMethods", func(t *testing.T) {
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// Host should pass authentication
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caps, err := p.authorizePeer(hostCreds)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Host should pass authentication, got: %v", err)
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}
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if !caps.Has(CapabilityAdmin) {
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t.Fatal("Host should have admin capability")
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}
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})
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}
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// TestIDMappedRootDetection tests container detection via ID mapping
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func TestIDMappedRootDetection(t *testing.T) {
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p := &Proxy{
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config: &Config{AllowIDMappedRoot: true},
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idMappedUIDRanges: []idRange{{start: 100000, length: 65536}},
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idMappedGIDRanges: []idRange{{start: 100000, length: 65536}},
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}
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tests := []struct {
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name string
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cred *peerCredentials
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isIDMapped bool
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}{
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{
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name: "Container root (ID-mapped)",
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cred: &peerCredentials{uid: 100000, gid: 100000},
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isIDMapped: true,
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},
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{
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name: "Container user inside range",
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cred: &peerCredentials{uid: 110000, gid: 110000},
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isIDMapped: true,
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},
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{
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name: "Container at range boundary",
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cred: &peerCredentials{uid: 165535, gid: 165535},
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isIDMapped: true,
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},
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{
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name: "Host root",
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cred: &peerCredentials{uid: 0, gid: 0},
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isIDMapped: false,
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},
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{
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name: "Host user (low UID)",
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cred: &peerCredentials{uid: 1000, gid: 1000},
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isIDMapped: false,
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},
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{
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name: "Outside range (high)",
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cred: &peerCredentials{uid: 200000, gid: 200000},
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isIDMapped: false,
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},
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{
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name: "UID in range but GID not (should fail)",
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cred: &peerCredentials{uid: 110000, gid: 50},
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isIDMapped: false,
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},
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{
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name: "GID in range but UID not (should fail)",
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cred: &peerCredentials{uid: 50, gid: 110000},
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isIDMapped: false,
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},
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}
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for _, tt := range tests {
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t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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got := p.isIDMappedRoot(tt.cred)
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if got != tt.isIDMapped {
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t.Errorf("isIDMappedRoot() = %v, want %v for uid=%d gid=%d",
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got, tt.isIDMapped, tt.cred.uid, tt.cred.gid)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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// TestIDMappedRootWithoutRanges tests behavior when no ID ranges configured
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func TestIDMappedRootWithoutRanges(t *testing.T) {
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p := &Proxy{
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config: &Config{AllowIDMappedRoot: true},
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idMappedUIDRanges: []idRange{}, // Empty
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idMappedGIDRanges: []idRange{}, // Empty
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}
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// Should return false when no ranges are configured
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cred := &peerCredentials{uid: 110000, gid: 110000}
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if p.isIDMappedRoot(cred) {
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t.Error("isIDMappedRoot should return false when no ranges configured")
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}
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}
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// TestIDMappedRootDisabled tests when AllowIDMappedRoot is disabled
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func TestIDMappedRootDisabled(t *testing.T) {
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p := &Proxy{
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config: &Config{AllowIDMappedRoot: false},
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allowedPeerUIDs: map[uint32]struct{}{0: {}},
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peerCapabilities: map[uint32]Capability{0: capabilityLegacyAll},
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idMappedUIDRanges: []idRange{{start: 100000, length: 65536}},
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idMappedGIDRanges: []idRange{{start: 100000, length: 65536}},
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}
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// Container credentials
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cred := &peerCredentials{uid: 110000, gid: 110000}
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// Should fail authorization when AllowIDMappedRoot is false
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if _, err := p.authorizePeer(cred); err == nil {
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t.Error("authorizePeer should fail for ID-mapped root when AllowIDMappedRoot is false")
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}
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}
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// TestMultipleIDRanges tests handling of multiple ID mapping ranges
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func TestMultipleIDRanges(t *testing.T) {
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p := &Proxy{
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config: &Config{AllowIDMappedRoot: true},
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idMappedUIDRanges: []idRange{
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{start: 100000, length: 65536},
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{start: 200000, length: 65536},
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},
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idMappedGIDRanges: []idRange{
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{start: 100000, length: 65536},
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{start: 200000, length: 65536},
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},
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}
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tests := []struct {
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name string
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uid uint32
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gid uint32
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isIDMapped bool
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}{
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{"First range", 110000, 110000, true},
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{"Second range", 210000, 210000, true},
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{"Between ranges", 180000, 180000, false},
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{"Below ranges", 50000, 50000, false},
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{"Above ranges", 300000, 300000, false},
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}
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for _, tt := range tests {
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t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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cred := &peerCredentials{uid: tt.uid, gid: tt.gid}
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got := p.isIDMappedRoot(cred)
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if got != tt.isIDMapped {
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t.Errorf("isIDMappedRoot() = %v, want %v for uid=%d gid=%d",
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got, tt.isIDMapped, tt.uid, tt.gid)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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