Files
Pulse/cmd/pulse-sensor-proxy/validation_test.go
rcourtman 7062b07411 feat(security): Add node allowlist validation to prevent SSRF attacks
Implements comprehensive node validation system to prevent SSRF attacks
via the temperature proxy. Addresses critical vulnerability where proxy
would SSH to any hostname/IP passing format validation.

Features:
- Configurable allowed_nodes list (hostnames, IPs, CIDR ranges)
- Automatic Proxmox cluster membership validation
- 5-minute cluster membership cache to reduce pvecm overhead
- strict_node_validation option for strict vs permissive modes
- New metric: pulse_proxy_node_validation_failures_total{node,reason}
- Logs blocked attempts at WARN level with 'potential SSRF attempt'

Configuration:
- allowed_nodes: [] (empty = auto-discover from cluster)
- strict_node_validation: true (require cluster membership)

Default behavior: Empty allowlist + Proxmox host = validate cluster
members (secure by default, backwards compatible).

Related to security audit 2025-11-07.

Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>
2025-11-07 17:08:28 +00:00

221 lines
7.1 KiB
Go

package main
import (
"context"
"net"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestSanitizeCorrelationID(t *testing.T) {
valid := sanitizeCorrelationID("550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000")
if valid != "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000" {
t.Fatalf("expected valid UUID to pass through, got %s", valid)
}
invalid := sanitizeCorrelationID("not-a-uuid")
if invalid == "not-a-uuid" {
t.Fatalf("expected invalid UUID to be replaced")
}
empty := sanitizeCorrelationID("")
if empty == "" {
t.Fatalf("expected empty string to be replaced")
}
if invalid == empty {
t.Fatalf("expected regenerated UUIDs to differ")
}
}
func TestValidateNodeName(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
wantErr bool
desc string
}{
{name: "node-1", wantErr: false, desc: "alphanumeric"},
{name: "example.com", wantErr: false, desc: "dns hostname"},
{name: "1.2.3.4", wantErr: false, desc: "ipv4"},
{name: "2001:db8::1", wantErr: false, desc: "ipv6 compressed"},
{name: "[2001:db8::10]", wantErr: false, desc: "ipv6 bracketed"},
{name: "::1", wantErr: false, desc: "ipv6 loopback"},
{name: "::", wantErr: false, desc: "ipv6 unspecified"},
{name: "::ffff:192.0.2.1", wantErr: false, desc: "ipv4-mapped ipv6 dual stack"},
{name: "[::1]", wantErr: false, desc: "ipv6 loopback bracketed"},
{name: "fe80::1%eth0", wantErr: true, desc: "ipv6 zone identifier"},
{name: "[fe80::1%eth0]", wantErr: true, desc: "ipv6 zone identifier bracketed"},
{name: "[2001:db8::1]:22", wantErr: true, desc: "ipv6 with port suffix"},
{name: "[2001:db8::1", wantErr: true, desc: "missing closing bracket"},
{name: "2001:db8::1]", wantErr: true, desc: "missing opening bracket"},
{name: "bad host", wantErr: true, desc: "whitespace disallowed"},
{name: "-leadinghyphen", wantErr: true, desc: "leading hyphen disallowed"},
{name: "example.com:22", wantErr: true, desc: "dns name with port"},
{name: "", wantErr: true, desc: "empty string"},
{name: "example_com", wantErr: false, desc: "underscore"},
{name: "NODE123", wantErr: false, desc: "uppercase"},
{name: strings.Repeat("a", 64), wantErr: false, desc: "64 chars"},
{name: strings.Repeat("a", 65), wantErr: true, desc: "65 chars"},
{name: "senso\u200Brs", wantErr: true, desc: "zero-width space"},
{name: "node\\name", wantErr: true, desc: "backslash"},
{name: "/etc/passwd", wantErr: true, desc: "absolute path"},
{name: "node\x00", wantErr: true, desc: "null byte"},
{name: "example.com;rm", wantErr: true, desc: "semicolon"},
{name: "node$(rm)", wantErr: true, desc: "subshell"},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
tc := tc
name := tc.desc
if name == "" {
name = tc.name
}
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
err := validateNodeName(tc.name)
if tc.wantErr && err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error validating %q", tc.name)
}
if !tc.wantErr && err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error for %q: %v", tc.name, err)
}
})
}
}
func TestValidateCommand(t *testing.T) {
type tc struct {
name string
args []string
wantErr bool
desc string
}
cases := []tc{
{name: "sensors", args: nil, wantErr: false, desc: "bare sensors"},
{name: "sensors", args: []string{"-j"}, wantErr: false, desc: "json flag"},
{name: "ipmitool", args: []string{"sdr"}, wantErr: false, desc: "safe ipmitool"},
{name: "sensors", args: []string{"; rm -rf /"}, wantErr: true, desc: "shell metachar"},
{name: "sensors", args: []string{"$(id)"}, wantErr: true, desc: "subshell"},
{name: "ipmitool", args: []string{"-H", "1.2.3.4", "&&", "shutdown"}, wantErr: true, desc: "command chaining"},
{name: "sensors", args: []string{">/tmp/out"}, wantErr: true, desc: "redirect"},
{name: "senso\u200Brs", wantErr: true, desc: "unicode homoglyph"},
{name: "sensors", args: []string{"-" + strings.Repeat("v", 2000)}, wantErr: true, desc: "arg too long"},
{name: "sensors", args: []string{"test\x00"}, wantErr: true, desc: "null byte arg"},
{name: "ipmitool", args: []string{"chassis", "power", "off"}, wantErr: true, desc: "dangerous ipmitool"},
{name: "sensors", args: []string{"LC_ALL=C"}, wantErr: true, desc: "env prefix"},
{name: "/usr/bin/sensors", wantErr: true, desc: "absolute path"},
{name: "ipmitool", args: []string{"--extraneous=../../etc/passwd"}, wantErr: true, desc: "path traversal"},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
tc := tc
if tc.desc == "" {
tc.desc = tc.name
}
t.Run(tc.desc, func(t *testing.T) {
err := validateCommand(tc.name, tc.args)
if tc.wantErr && err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error for %s %v", tc.name, tc.args)
}
if !tc.wantErr && err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error for %s %v: %v", tc.name, tc.args, err)
}
})
}
}
type stubResolver struct {
ips []net.IP
err error
}
func (s stubResolver) LookupIP(ctx context.Context, host string) ([]net.IP, error) {
if s.err != nil {
return nil, s.err
}
return s.ips, nil
}
func TestNodeValidatorAllowlistHost(t *testing.T) {
v := &nodeValidator{
allowHosts: map[string]struct{}{"node-1": {}},
hasAllowlist: true,
resolver: stubResolver{},
}
if err := v.Validate(context.Background(), "node-1"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected node-1 to be permitted, got error: %v", err)
}
if err := v.Validate(context.Background(), "node-2"); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected node-2 to be rejected without allow-list entry")
}
}
func TestNodeValidatorAllowlistCIDRWithLookup(t *testing.T) {
_, network, _ := net.ParseCIDR("10.0.0.0/24")
v := &nodeValidator{
allowHosts: make(map[string]struct{}),
allowCIDRs: []*net.IPNet{network},
hasAllowlist: true,
resolver: stubResolver{
ips: []net.IP{net.ParseIP("10.0.0.5")},
},
}
if err := v.Validate(context.Background(), "worker.local"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected worker.local to resolve into allowed CIDR: %v", err)
}
}
func TestNodeValidatorClusterCaching(t *testing.T) {
current := time.Now()
fetches := 0
v := &nodeValidator{
clusterEnabled: true,
clusterFetcher: func() ([]string, error) {
fetches++
return []string{"10.0.0.9"}, nil
},
cacheTTL: nodeValidatorCacheTTL,
clock: func() time.Time {
return current
},
}
if err := v.Validate(context.Background(), "10.0.0.9"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected node to be allowed via cluster membership: %v", err)
}
if fetches != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected initial cluster fetch, got %d", fetches)
}
current = current.Add(30 * time.Second)
if err := v.Validate(context.Background(), "10.0.0.9"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected cached cluster membership to allow node: %v", err)
}
if fetches != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected cache hit to avoid new fetch, got %d fetches", fetches)
}
current = current.Add(nodeValidatorCacheTTL + time.Second)
if err := v.Validate(context.Background(), "10.0.0.9"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected refreshed cluster membership to allow node: %v", err)
}
if fetches != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected cache expiry to trigger new fetch, got %d", fetches)
}
}
func TestNodeValidatorStrictNoSources(t *testing.T) {
v := &nodeValidator{
strict: true,
}
if err := v.Validate(context.Background(), "node-1"); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected strict mode without sources to reject nodes")
}
}